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Both public and private intermediaries have played important roles
as service providers throughout the history of publicly funded employ-
ment and training programs. The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of
1998 expanded the role of intermediaries participating in the workforce
investment system by establishing new one-stop operator roles and
excluding local workforce investment boards (local boards) from being
direct service providers, unless waivers have been approved.1 At the
same time, WIA introduced a voucher system and state eligible train-
ing provider list (ETPL) to the training program, which had varying
effects on the availability of training providers to customers. New rules
governing how services can be provided and who provides them have
changed the mix of intermediaries participating in the system. 
Intermediaries that provide services under WIA receive funds from
local boards to provide direct employment and training services to cus-
tomers, or facilitate workforce development in the one-stop environ-
ment. Intermediaries serve in a range of capacities: as one-stop
operators; core, intensive, or youth service providers; training provid-
ers; and brokering or consulting organizations. This chapter identifies
intermediaries as falling into four general types of organizations: 1)
nonprofit organizations, such as community-based and faith-based
organizations; 2) community colleges and other educational institu-
tions; 3) public governmental agencies, such as the state Employment
Service (ES); and 4) for-profit companies and proprietary schools.
Recent research indicates a great deal of variation and experimentation
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with how local boards work with different types of intermediaries in
fulfilling WIA responsibilities. 
The following section provides a brief background on the history
and growth of intermediaries in employment and training programs,
from the 1930s through the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982. We
then describe the general nature of intermediaries in the one-stop sys-
tem under WIA implementation, synthesizing findings from other
research about local board experiences. We also describe the early
impacts of state ETPLs on the availability of different types of training
providers during initial and subsequent eligibility. The next section
summarizes four intermediary organizations and explores the advan-
tages of utilizing economies of scale to compete in the one-stop sys-
tem. Finally, we present a summary and conclusions in the last section. 
HISTORY AND GROWTH OF INTERMEDIARIES 
PRIOR TO WIA
The use of intermediaries in public employment and training pro-
grams has increased over time since the inception of the workforce
investment system. The workforce investment system was introduced
in the United States as a public responsibility to stabilize the U.S. econ-
omy in the wake of persistently high unemployment rates experienced
in the 1930s and the implementation of similar systems in other indus-
trialized nations. The system was created with the implementation of
ES and Unemployment Insurance (UI) as federal–state programs.2 ES
and UI had experimented with using the private sector in service deliv-
ery; however, that alternative was ultimately rejected, and service
delivery for these programs has since remained in the public sector.3 It
was not until the 1960s, when Congress passed the first major legisla-
tion to provide extensive job training through the Manpower Develop-
ment and Training Act (MDTA), that the system would rely heavily
also on the private sector to deliver publicly funded services. 
The training program under MDTA was federally administered,
with training providers subcontracted or contracted directly with the
federal government to deliver classroom training to customers. At the
onset of this new program, a range of intermediaries, such as commu-
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nity colleges, public schools, skill centers, and private schools, were
used to deliver training (Levitan and Mangum 1969; Operations
Research, Inc. 1972).4 State ES offices continued to provide labor
exchange services to customers, both job-seekers and employers, as a
separate program under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933. Over time,
while other employment and training programs became affected by
decentralization efforts, ES and UI continued to function as federal–
state programs.
In 1973, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA) superseded MDTA and established state and local control in
the coordination of services for most of the employment and training
programs. Among the changes that were made, CETA required the cre-
ation of local “prime sponsors” to coordinate CETA programs. Unlike
MDTA, this structure required service providers to compete for fund-
ing directly from prime sponsors, a requirement intended to open the
market for competition of services (Franklin 1984). This movement of
program control from the federal government to localities had a num-
ber of results during early implementation: 1) the number of employ-
ment and training service providers increased from about 1,440 in
fiscal year (FY) 1974 to over 2,400 in FY 1975; 2) prime sponsors
became new entities that delivered services, with about 60 percent of
the prime sponsors delivering services; 3) prime sponsors shifted away
from the state ES as a service provider and transferred contracts to
themselves or other organizations; 4) prime sponsors had more flexibil-
ity in designing service delivery of the training program; and 5) com-
munity-based organizations (CBOs) had significant increases in work
and funding in the system (Franklin and Ripley 1984; Snedeker and
Snedeker 1978).5 
The flexibility given to prime sponsors resulted in less utilization
of ES to provide labor exchange services for the CETA programs.
Unlike its role under MDTA, where ES was the accepted and presumed
provider of these services, ES now needed to compete with other orga-
nizations to provide the services. Even though some localities contin-
ued to contract with ES because they believed it was important,
especially in the long run, to maintain a linkage with an established
agency that delivered employment services, others took advantage of
their flexibility to seek other alternatives. As a result, during FY 1974–
1976, ES staff positions decreased by one-quarter when contracts were
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awarded to other organizations.6 On the other hand, training was deliv-
ered by many of the same types of training providers as previous years,
although prime sponsors became more actively involved in determin-
ing the types of training to be offered, and funding levels differed from
previous years. Training was more often delivered by public educa-
tional institutions than private institutions, with over 90 percent of
CETA training funds contracted to public educational institutions.7
Some localities also began to utilize an individual referral system in
place of contracting for group training (Snedeker and Snedeker 1978).
CETA changed the nature of service provision as a by-product of shift-
ing to locally administered program operations from federal adminis-
tration under MDTA.
CETA continued for nearly a decade before the Job Training Part-
nership Act (JTPA) replaced it in 1982, significantly reducing the fed-
eral and state role (Reville and Kerman 1996). Local decision making
on employment and training programs went from CETA prime spon-
sors to JTPA private industry councils (PICs), which required private
sector majority representation. Also, greater emphasis was placed on
the job training program given the cutback in the Public Service
Employment program, which was a major CETA program that focused
on job creation. 
PICs had the flexibility to administer their own programs, but they
generally found that contracting out for the services was a more cost-
effective alternative (National Commission for Employment Policy
1994). PICs also chose to contract out if they believed that their role
should be strictly in a policy and administrative capacity, and that their
ability to manage, monitor, and evaluate programs would be compro-
mised if they also became the service delivery organization. 
In the selection of service providers, coordination between the
JTPA and ES programs was supported among a number of states and
PICs. Because the ES federal budget tended to be stagnant and declin-
ing in real terms, ES had an incentive to coordinate and make use of
JTPA as a source of additional funding. At the same time, some PICs
found that the 15 percent administrative cap for the JTPA programs
was insufficient for program management, and ES became a likely
choice because they believed ES was cost-effective and well-estab-
lished within the community.8 However, a number of PICs also chose
not to contract with ES, believing that they could obtain better counsel-
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ing and employment assistance services elsewhere for their customers
(Westat 1985). 
During the 1990s, states and localities experienced shifts in the
welfare programs that would later have an influence on employment
and training programs. Prior to the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, state innovation
in the welfare program was supported through state waivers of federal
requirements. The use of block grants under PRWORA provided states
with a greater deal of flexibility than any other previous legislation. As
welfare rolls fell sharply in the late 1990s, the amount of funds avail-
able for employment and support services soared, and some of this
funding was provided to localities to serve welfare recipients and low-
wage workers. In 1997, similar use of grants for the Department of
Labor/Employment and Training Administration (ETA) Welfare-to-
Work program to assist the “harder-to-serve” welfare recipients pro-
vided more flexibility to localities in determining program operation
and design than any previous ETA program (Leonard 1999).9
The devolved system of Welfare-to-Work—and welfare employ-
ment program under state waivers and PRWORA—provided some
insight on how more mature systems under WIA might react to
increased flexibility and local oversight. In 1999, an intermediary
study for the TANF and Welfare-to-Work programs found that most of
the intermediaries in 20 localities were nonprofits with established his-
tories in the field. Many were either affiliates of national organizations
or specialized in assisting specific populations. Although considerably
fewer numbers of for-profit intermediaries served welfare recipients,
for-profit intermediaries tended to serve larger numbers of welfare
recipients. In fact, the study suggested that for-profit intermediaries
served about 45 percent of the welfare population in the study’s locali-
ties (Pavetti et al. 2000). The significant role of nonprofit and for-profit
intermediaries in the Welfare-to-Work programs is similarly reflected
in early program experiences under WIA.
The 1990s also gave rise to federal efforts towards developing a
one-stop delivery system, with federal one-stop initiative grants
awarded to 50 states for capacity building and planning of one-stops.
Initiatives were also being implemented at the state level (e.g., Florida,
Massachusetts, and Texas) to undertake further changes to the system.
When WIA legislation passed, and local control of programs changed
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hands from PICs to local boards, the experiences of planning and
implementing a one-stop system among states and localities were quite
mixed.10 
THE NATURE OF INTERMEDIARIES IN THE ONE-STOP 
SYSTEM UNDER WIA
This section relies on a small number of studies that have exam-
ined the use of intermediaries for different types of WIA services: one-
stop operations, and core, intensive, youth, training, and brokering/
consulting services. To better understand how the system and providers
participating in the system have changed from JTPA to WIA, ETA
funded a study on service provision among 16 local boards in the one-
stop environment (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).11 Analysis
in this section uses the results of the study, as well as other key studies:
the Private/Public Venture study of 5 local boards (Buck 2002); a study
on early WIA implementing states, with site visits to 6 states and 9
local boards within those states (D’Amico et al. 2001); and a study of
the Individual Training Account/Eligible Training Provider (ITA/ETP)
Demonstration, with site visits to 28 local boards (D’Amico et al.
2002; D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming). 
Table 5.1 summarizes information from site visits and research
conducted by Macro et al. (2003) of 16 localities within 8 states for
program year (PY) 2001 (July 1, 2001–June 30, 2002). The 16 locali-
ties included a total of 84 comprehensive one-stop centers and 71 affil-
iate (e.g., satellite and/or specialty) centers. The local boards for each
of these localities were not selected to be representative of the national
one-stop system, which (as of September 2003) consisted of nearly 600
local boards, over 1,900 comprehensive one-stop centers, and over
1,600 affiliate centers. However, Table 5.1 provides useful information
on the type and mix of intermediaries that were used within the one-
stop system.12 
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One-Stop Operator Services
Local boards have wide discretion in defining one-stop operator
responsibilities, such as the division of labor between one-stop opera-
tors and organizations providing other services. One-stop operators can
be responsible for coordinating with core and intensive service provid-
ers, or can serve as the exclusive intermediary for these services. One-
stop operators may also subcontract directly with other providers, serve
as lead providers, or serve in other capacities designated by their local
boards. Local boards make their selection either through a competitive
process or various non-competitive processes. The noncompetitive
processes include: 1) an agreement with the local board to operate as a
consortium or entity of at least three required partners; 2) a waiver by
the chief local elected official and governor for the local board to act as
the one-stop operator; and 3) certifying, or “grandfathering,” existing
service providers as one-stop operators.
Many local boards have opted for continuity of providers without
further competition by extending contracts, grandfathering existing
providers, or designating consortiums. Of the local boards visited in
the early WIA implementation study, half used a noncompetitive pro-
cess to select consortiums of partners to serve as one-stop operators
(D’Amico et al. 2001). Macro et al. (2003) found that half of the local
boards in the intermediary study also used a noncompetitive process,
but local boards selected consortiums of partners as well as grandfa-
thered existing service providers. Only one local board in the interme-
diary study requested and received a waiver to serve as a one-stop
operator. This differed from the early WIA implementation study,
which found that 18.4 percent of the local boards nationwide received
waivers (D’Amico et al. 2001).13
Risk aversion may be one reason why local boards have chosen not
to compete or re-compete services. Competing for a service or chang-
ing to a new provider can give local boards new opportunities for
improvement, but it can also expose local programs to risk. The period
of turnover and transition can be lengthy, and consequences can
include disruption of services and the perception among customers and
one-stop staff of an unstable system. Services may improve or worsen,
costs may increase or decline, all with effects on the number of cus-
tomers served and the quality of services delivered. Extensive training
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(July 1, 2001–June 30, 2002)


















One-stop operators (number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 1 (4) 2 (2)b 2 (2)c 1 (2) 2 (2)
For profit
Governmental 1 (1)d 1 (1) 3 (5)
Educational 1 (3)
Consortium 1 (1)e 1 (1)f
Local board 1 (1)
Competitive 
process used
   
Core service providers (estimated number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers and satellite/specialty centers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 1 (5) 6 (6) 2 (2)j 1 (1) 2 (3)
For profit
Government: ESk 1 (5) 1 (6) 1 (6) 1 (2) 1 (8)l 1 (4) 1 (1) 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (7)
Other 
government 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (1)
Educational 1 (6) 1 (1) 1 (1) 3 (6)
Local board 1 (1)
Intensive service providers (estimated number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers and satellite/specialty centers in 
parentheses)
Nonprofit 2 (2) 2 (2) 5 (8)m 5 (4) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 3 (3)
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For profit 1 (8) 1 (1)
Government: ES 1 (1)
Other 
government 1 (5) 1 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1)
Educational 1 (6) 1 (8) 1 (1) 1 (2) 3 (6)
Youth service providers (total number of providers serving entire local workforce investment area)
Nonprofit 1 2 9 5 1 1 3 5
For profit 2
Governmental 1 1
Educational 2 1 9 3 7
Consortium 3 1 1
Training providers that received an ITA (number of ITAs issued to providers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 1 (5) 1 (4) 16 (282) 7 (115) 2 (72) 1 (108) 3 (20) 4 (16) 1 (3)
For profit 29 (543) 7 (20) 17 (90) 14 (149) 17 (306) 27 (526) 60 (221) 51 (329) 11 (52) 3 (3)
Governmental
Educational 10 (1,042) 4 (399) 5 (23) 4 (37) 5 (236) 4 (225) 6 (12) 14 (67) 6 (216) 5 (34)
Total training 
providers used 40 12 38 25 24 32 69 69 17 9
Total ITAs 
issued 1,590 423 395 301 614 859 253 412 268 40
(continued)
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One-stop operators (number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 4 (22) 3 (6) 15 (40) 38 (48)
For profit 1 (7) 1 (1) 2 (8) 5 (10)
Governmental 1 (6) 3 (8) 8 (10)
Educational 4 (8) 10 (10)
Consortium 1 (5)g 1 (2)h 10 (10)i 14 (19) 36 (23)




Core service providers (estimated number of comprehensive one-stop centers and satellite/specialty centers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 2 (4) 8 (9) 4 (25) 1 (6) 5 (5) 1 (1) 33 (67) 48 (32)
For profit 1 (4) 1 (7) 2 (11) 3 (5)
Government: ESk 1 (4) 1 (2) 1 (29) 1 (6) 1 (10) 1 (8) 16 (102) 23 (49)
Other 
government
1 (4) 4 (2) 1 (2) 1 (1) 10 (14) 14 (7)
Educational 1 (1) 7 (15) 11 (7)
Local board 1 (1) 1 (<1)
Intensive service providers (estimated number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers and satellite/specialty centers in 
parentheses)
Nonprofit 1 (4) 10 (2) 4 (25) 27 (7) 6 (5) 7 (8) 75 (74) 75 (51)
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a Does not add up to 100% due to rounding.
b Boston selected organizations that were formed of a collaborative of two or more organizations with a designated lead organization. The
organizations consisted of 1) Jewish Vocational Services (nonprofit lead organization), which partnered with the Economic Develop-
ment and Industrial Corporation of Boston/Jobs & Community Services Department (government); and 2) Goodwill Industries (non-
profit lead organization), which partnered with Dimock Community Health Center and Women’s Educational and Industrial Union
(nonprofits).
For profit 1(4) 1 (2) 1 (7) 5 (22) 5 (15)
Government: ES 1 (3) 2 (4) 2 (1)
Other 
government
1 (2) 1 (6) 1 (1) 7 (18) 7 (5)
Educational 1 (2) 2 (7) 1 (1) 11 (27) 11 (8)
Youth service providers (total number of providers serving entire local workforce investment area)
Nonprofit 1n 19 4 9 5 26 91 65%
For profit 1 1 4 3%
Governmental 2 1%
Educational 6 2 1 2 33 24%
Consortium 2 2 9 6%
Training providers that received an ITA (number of ITAs issued to provider in parentheses)
Nonprofit 2 (8) 2 (2) 1 (10) 1 (22) 13 (328) 55 (995) 9 (9)
For profit 32 (312) 27 (150) 38 (1,158) 19 (251) 5 (20) 45 (838) 402 (4,968) 68 (44)
Governmental 1 (5) 1 (5) <1 (<1)
Educational 11 (43) 9 (65) 13 (1,372) 9 (207) 18 (1,080) 9 (359) 132 (5,417) 22 (48)
Total providers 
used
45 38 52 29 24 68 591
Total ITAs 
issued
363 217 2,540 463 1,122 1,530 11,390
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c Hampden County selected a nonprofit organization, CareerPoint, began as a collaborative of local public agencies in 1995.
d Boston’s other collaborative organization included the state’s Department of Employment and Training as the lead organization that
partnered with Action for Boston Community Development (nonprofit).
e The consortium included Truckee Meadows Community College (educational), Department of Training and Rehabilitation (state gov-
ernment), and Nevada Works (Local Board).
f The consortium included Nevada Business Services (nonprofit), S.T. Gregg & Associates (for-profit), Nevada Partners (nonprofit),
Vocational Rehabilitation (government) and Employment Service (government).
g The consortium consisted of the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation (government), Bureau of Employment and Career Services (state
Wagner-Peyser agency), Greater Erie Community Action Committee (nonprofit), and Northwestern Regional Technology Institute (for-
profit). Each of the five one-stop centers also had an additional partner who was the leaseholder. Pennsylvania’s State Department of
Transportation (government), Community Action Inc. (nonprofit), Warren/Forest Counties Economic Opportunity Council (nonprofit),
Meadville Area Industrial Commission (nonprofit), and the Greater Erie Community Action Committee (nonprofit).
h The consortium consisted of the Pittsburgh Partnership (government), Allegheny County Department of Human Services (government),
Bureau of Employment and Career Services (state Wagner-Peyser agency, Office of Vocational Rehabilitation (government), and Good-
will Industries (nonprofit). Other nonprofit organizations also served as a partner.
i One of the consortiums for the one-stop centers consisted of ES, Job Corps, Vocational Rehabilitation, county Human Services Depart-
ment, Goodwill, two nonprofits, state technical college, and two Cooperative Education Services Agencies. The other consortium con-
sisted of ES, Vocational Rehabilitation, county Departments of Human Services and Economic Support, a nonprofit, state technical
college, and school-to-work program.
j The government agency of the nonprofit organization delivered core services.
k The Employment Service (ES) is a system of public employment offices that was established under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933.
This system has also been known by other names, such as the Job Service, the Labor Board, and the Unemployment Office.
l All WIA partners also helped contribute in the delivery of core services.
mAll WIA partners also helped contribute in the delivery of intensive services.
n The nonprofit organization subcontracted with three regional organizations.
SOURCE: Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague. (2003).
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to staff of the new organization, and the transitional costs related to
changing from one organization to another, can also lead to greater
expenses for local boards (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).14
The WIA system has had little experience with turnover, both because
of the noncompetitive processes in place and because many new com-
petitive awards have not expired. Macro et al. (2003) reported that
when turnover did occur, it generally related to the organizations’
inability to handle the fiscal management of operations, which was
described as a greater issue for smaller organizations since a line of
credit was necessary in order to operate on a cost-reimbursement con-
tract. 
Many types of intermediaries, including local boards and consor-
tiums of intermediaries, actively participate as one-stop operators.
Table 5.1 shows that a wide range of intermediaries served as one-stop
operators, but with different levels of participation. For example,
Macro et al. (2003) found that nonprofits were contracted to operate
more one-stops than any other type of intermediary.15 The significant
role of nonprofits as one-stop operators was similar to Buck’s (2002)
findings that nonprofits were used more than any other type of interme-
diary in the study’s five localities. Macro et al. (2003) also found that
consortiums of public and/or private organizations were selected to
operate nearly one-quarter of the one-stops, with five local boards uti-
lizing this approach.16 Community colleges, government agencies, and
for-profits were selected in a handful of localities. The governmental
agencies were generally the local employment and training agencies,
and the for-profits were Maximus and Affiliated Computer Services
(ACS), formerly Lockheed Martin IMS.17 
A number of reasons can help explain the types of intermediaries
that have emerged as one-stop operators under WIA. For instance,
states’ policies can affect the types of intermediaries that are selected,
such as Nevada requiring the use of consortiums with mandatory part-
ners; Pennsylvania requiring consortiums with public and private enti-
ties; and Wisconsin explicitly prohibiting waiver requests from local
boards to deliver direct services. Local constraints or policies can also
be a factor, such as the perception among the community that nonprof-
its are more appropriate than others to serve as one-stop operators, for
example, a for-profit affiliate in Hampden County (New Jersey)
became a nonprofit organization after community pressure to do so.
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Unexpected situations can also occur, such as when the Lane County
(Oregon) local board requested a waiver to temporarily serve as a one-
stop operator after it began to have financial concerns with the non-
profit organization it originally selected (Macro, Almandsmith, and
Hague 2003). In Montgomery County (Maryland), the one-stop opera-
tor (a for-profit organization) declined to re-bid on the contract because
it believed there was insufficient funding for operations. As a result,
staff of the for-profit left the company to incorporate themselves into a
new nonprofit that bid for, and was awarded, the contract (Jacobson
2002).18 In other instances, new organizations formed when two PIC
areas merged into a single WIA local area. One of the former PICs gen-
erally became the new local board, while the other often played a role
in one-stop operations, for example, in Gulf Coast (Texas), the former
PIC of Houston designated itself into a nonprofit organization and
became the new one-stop operator; and in the Bay Area and Northwest
Pennsylvania, the former PICs either became a part of or worked for
the one-stop consortiums. 
Another response to the one-stop operator role by some consor-
tiums has been to incorporate themselves from two or more public and/
or private entities into single nonprofit organizations. The motivation
for incorporating two or more organizations into a single organization
included the benefits of hiring personnel so that a definitive line of
authority among staff existed, and simplified administration and
accounting. This was perceived in some areas, such as Bay Area (Wis-
consin) and Hampden County (Massachusetts), as a more practical
approach than having the one-stop operator use various administration
and accounting systems (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
The one-stop operator role can be a desirable one for many organi-
zations. Local boards have commonly assigned the responsibilities of
core and/or intensive service delivery with one-stop operations for
competitive solicitations (D’Amico et al. 2001, Macro, Almandsmith,
and Hague 2003). 
As a result, service providers used under JTPA may find it benefi-
cial to bid as one-stop operators in order to continue delivering services
under WIA. Some organizations have also noted that the one-stop
operator role is beneficial in that it allows their organization to main-
tain a presence in the workforce investment system (Macro, Almand-
smith, and Hague 2003). 
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Core Services
A major difference between services delivered under JTPA and
WIA is the “universal access” requirement that is applied to core ser-
vices. Since core services are not restricted to any special or targeted
population, customers are able to access a variety of core services,
which can include self-services in resource rooms (e.g., computer
access to labor information, automated labor exchange and job search,
resume preparation software, self-assessment tools, and fax and tele-
phone services) or staff-assisted services (e.g., labor exchange, job
search, assessment, and counseling).
ES continues to serve as a major labor exchange provider under
WIA. The selection of ES as the primary provider of core services was
evident in 45 percent of the one-stops in the intermediary study, with
nearly three-fourths of the local boards selecting ES as the primary
provider. Even when ES was not a primary provider, ES played a role
in the core service delivery structure among all of the comprehensive
one-stops (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). The significance of
ES, particularly as primary core service providers, was also evident
among a majority of the nine local boards in the early WIA implemen-
tation study (D’Amico et al. 2001).19 This is likely the result of the state
ES having the legislative and appropriation mandate to provide Wag-
ner-Peyser services in comprehensive one-stop centers, and local
boards determining that ES would be useful intermediaries to pro-
vide—in whole or in part—these types of services as core services.
Local boards can define the role of ES in the one-stop system in vari-
ous ways, such as by placing core service delivery entirely with ES, as
a shared responsibility between ES and other organizations, or as the
sole responsibility of another organization, such as the one-stop opera-
tor. When ES was not the primary provider of core services, Macro et
al. (2003) found that the one-stop operator held primary responsibility
for core service delivery, and those tended to be nonprofit organiza-
tions.20 
The important role of ES in providing core services today reflects
its expanding role in providing similar “core services” to ES applicants
in the years just prior to the enactment and implementation of WIA.
For example, in PY 1998, of the 17.3 million total applicants, 63 per-
cent received some reportable services, including 11 percent receiving
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assessment services, 36 percent receiving job search services, 2 percent
referred to training, and 40 percent referred to employment. During the
mid 1990s, ES experienced a large increase in providing “core ser-
vices,” especially job search assistance, as ES became the primary pro-
vider of reemployment services for workers served by the Worker
Profiling and Reemployment Service initiative that was enacted in
1993 (USDOL 2000; Wandner 1997).
Intensive Services
Intensive services include more individualized assistance from
one-stop staff to help move customers into employment, self-suffi-
ciency, or training. Customers can receive intensive services such as
assessment, career counseling, financial management, training assis-
tance, and additional placement services. While local boards can apply
for a waiver to deliver direct services, only a small proportion of local-
ities have done so.21 Instead, nonprofits tend to play a significant role
as intensive service providers; for example, Macro et al. (2003) found
that nonprofits delivered services to the majority of one-stops across
the 16 local boards of the intermediary study. 22 
The extensive use of nonprofits could be explained in part by the
fact that local boards often assigned intensive delivery responsibilities
to the one-stop operator, who tended to be nonprofits. Many of the
organizations had established histories with delivering employment
and training services and assisting specific populations, e.g., the local
affiliate of the AFL-CIO in Milwaukee and the community college in
Lane County assisted the dislocated worker population, and the Wis-
consin Correctional Service assisted the ex-offender population
(Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). The lack of such established
relationships or prior experience could pose some difficulty for new
organizations trying to enter the local market of service delivery.
The quality of intensive services can vary across and within differ-
ent types of intermediaries, with some intermediaries delivering ser-
vices that may result in better outcomes. However, there has not been a
great deal of research in this area. An experimental study operated by
the Kalamazoo–St. Joseph County Workforce Development Board
(Michigan) from 1998 to 2000 made use of three nonprofit organiza-
tions, Goodwill Industries, Behavioral Foundation, and YOU, to deliver
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welfare-to-work services. Each provider had a different philosophy and
approach to delivering services, with some providing more intensive
services than others to welfare recipients, based on local staff observa-
tions. When each organization was funded at the same level per partic-
ipant, Goodwill Industries was more successful than the other two
providers in having welfare recipients become employed for 90 days.
Goodwill provided the most intensive services, followed by Behavioral
Foundation, and then by YOU. Thus, with respect to achieving employ-
ment, Goodwill Industries in this case had an absolute advantage over
the other two service providers. Goodwill could better serve welfare
recipients whether they were easy, moderate, or difficult in their ability
to find employment. Goodwill has a long history working with econom-
ically disadvantaged individuals and a philosophy that was highly sup-
portive of individuals. The study found that, because of differing
intensity of services provided, the three providers could be assigned
participants by their difficulties in finding a job to determine the best
mix of participant employment outcomes (Eberts 2002). Thus, better
matching clients with the appropriate service providers and services can
improve outcome results and cost-effectiveness.
Youth Services
WIA affected youth programs by combining the year-round and
summer youth programs into a single program. Additionally, the new
combined youth program under WIA is subject to performance stan-
dards, unlike the summer youth program under JTPA. While many
localities experienced and welcomed the increase in bids for contracts
by intermediaries between the first and second year of WIA implemen-
tation, some localities predicted a possible decrease of competition
from providers due to additional data requirements and services
expected from providers without sufficient funding (Macro, Almand-
smith, and Hague 2003). 
Localities use different approaches to delivering youth services.
Many have used multiple types of service providers for their youth
population (see Table 5.1). Services may be delivered within the one-
stop center by the one-stop operator staff, within the one-stop center by
co-located organizations, or in specialized youth or other affiliate cen-
ters located outside of the comprehensive one-stop by contracted orga-
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nizations. Intermediaries are typically selected through a competitive
process with contracts for a one-year duration.
Localities utilized consortiums and various types of single organi-
zations to deliver youth services, but nonprofits delivered a majority of
the services (D’Amico et al. 2001). Similarly, in the ETA intermediary
study, the majority of youth service providers were nonprofits. Almost
one-quarter of the organizations were educational institutions, such as
school districts and post-secondary institutions, while governmental
entities and for-profits were among the least reported types of interme-
diaries used (see Table 5.1).23 
Training Services
WIA legislation affected local training programs in a significant
way, by requiring the use of individual training accounts (ITAs) and
state ETPLs to provide increased customer choice while holding train-
ing providers accountable to performance measures. WIA experience
has shown that the mix, availability, and utilization of training provid-
ers has changed as a result of these new features. The following section
identifies key issues that affect training providers under initial and sub-
sequent eligibility periods of WIA. It also focuses on three types of
training providerseducational institutions, nonprofits, and for-prof-
its that play important roles in the public training program. 
Early WIA experiences and intermediary responses
Localities experienced and anticipated changes in the availability
and usage of different types of training providers with the transition to
the ITA and ETPL systems. The potential loss, rather than increase, of
providers has been one of the criticisms of the changes made to the
training program. Indeed, in a study of five localities during early WIA
implementation, Buck (2002) observed a voluntary loss of CBOs and
other nonprofits; for example, Orlando lost all of its CBOs and non-
profits, and Houston lost many of its CBOs likely due to required per-
formance benchmarks.24 At the same time, however, Boston and
Philadelphia both experienced overall increases in providers, many of
which were for-profit providers new to the system. Macro et al. (2003)
similarly found that most localities experienced an overall increase in
training provider choices for customers. This takes into account that
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many states waived some, if not most, of the reporting requirements for
the initial eligibility period. Few had begun subsequent eligibility, and
most localities anticipated that performance requirements would affect
provider participation during subsequent eligibility once requirements
were enforced. 
The prospect of losing a large number of providers once subse-
quent eligibility began was a concern to many states, including Indi-
ana, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. D’Amico
and Salzman (forthcoming) found that at least 3 of the 28 localities vis-
ited had reported that some training providers refused to participate
due to the reporting requirements, and four other localities believed
that reporting requirements would adversely affect training providers’
participation in the system. 
Performance reporting requirements have been identified as poten-
tial barriers to the continuing participation of certain types of training
providers, especially community colleges and other educational institu-
tions (D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming; Macro, Almandsmith, and
Hague 2003). Placement on the state ETPL requires that training pro-
viders submit performance and cost information, e.g., completion,
placement, retention, employment, and wage information. Providers
must also meet WIA performance measures to remain eligible to par-
ticipate. This requires many training providers to establish new sys-
tems of data collection and reporting, which many have considered
onerous. Texas, an early WIA implementing state, experienced an ini-
tial decline in community colleges in response to the introduction of
performance reporting requirements. The programs available to local
customers decreased from 8,000 to 1,000 training programs on the
ETPL once subsequent eligibility began. Texas was later able to recap-
ture its earlier numbers after it took steps to restore participation of
training providers. Other states, such as Oregon and Florida, took simi-
lar efforts to coordinate among the community colleges and the work-
force investment system for continued participation in the local
training programs (D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming).
Despite much of the effort invested into the development of the
ETPL and Consumer Reports Systems (CRS), states have for a number
of reasons requested waivers to extend their initial eligibility period,
thereby delaying subsequent eligibility. As of July 2003, ETA received
requests from 27 states for extensions in the initial period of provider
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eligibility by waiving the 18-month requirement for subsequent eligi-
bility. Most of the states requested extensions of initial eligibility
through June 2004—past the expected WIA reauthorization.25 In order
to relieve information collection by training providers, states are look-
ing at utilizing existing data sources. Some states, such as Texas, are
looking at using state Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records, and
Florida is using its database on community college enrollees (Macro,
Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
In addition to data collection, certification became another issue
for some states and localities. In these instances, state policy required
that training providers also be certified or licensed by the state’s higher
education commission (or equivalent).26 In Connecticut, which used
noncertified providers under JTPA for class-size training, localities in
the state could no longer refer ITA customers to those providers until
they became state-certified and approved on the ETPL. In Orlando,
none of the CBOs or nonprofits applied for the state ETPL as a result
of the locality requiring that providers be certified with the Florida
Department of Education (Buck 2002). Georgia, which also imposed a
state certification requirement, provided some initial exceptions for
WIA participation to noncertified providers if they showed that they
had applied for certification (D’Amico et al. 2002). 
The decision of training providers not to participate in WIA was
made easier by the fact that WIA provides for only a small proportion
of the workforce development services and financing around the coun-
try. In Texas, the state Education Agency and the state Higher Educa-
tion Coordinating Board provided at least 40 percent of the workforce
development funds in 2000. Within the Texas Workforce Commission,
WIA provided only one-sixth of the funding for workforce services in
2000, and relied on other sources, such as Welfare-to-Work grants,
Food Stamp program, TANF work programs, and the Employment Ser-
vice (O’Shea and King 2001). In Philadelphia, the first-year WIA allo-
cation was $17 million, which was less than one-seventh of the funding
for workforce services (Buck 2002).27 With WIA funds dwarfed by
other federal sources, training providers may seek to participate in pub-
licly funded training outside the WIA system.
State and local variation in the application and eligibility process
can also be perceived as more burdensome for some training providers.
Some states (e.g., Georgia, Michigan, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania)
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require training providers to submit applications to a central state
office; other states (e.g., California) have training providers submit
applications to their own localities; and others (e.g., North Carolina
and Texas) have providers submit applications to multiple areas for
determination. Additionally, local boards can set up different local per-
formance standards than their neighbors, so long as their policies meet
or exceed their states’ performance standards. In effect, an approved
training provider in one locality does not necessarily translate into an
approved provider for another locality, even within the same state.
These local variations can be a cumbersome and confusing process for
training providers, especially when they serve multiple areas. To create
a more “regional” approach to the requirements, some local boards
have begun work with neighboring boards to develop consistency in
how providers would be used; for example, local boards in Texas have
agreements to use providers approved by their neighboring local
boards, and the local boards of the Detroit and Atlanta areas are also
working towards more consistency in their respective regions (Macro,
Almandsmith, and Hague 2003; D’Amico et al. 2002). 
In an effort to encourage training providers to focus on improving
customer outcomes, some local boards have experimented with alter-
native methods, such as “benchmarking” payments made to training
providers. In Southwest Connecticut, 50 percent of the training fees
was paid to a provider when the customer completed the first half of
the program, 25 percent of the fees was paid when the customer com-
pleted the program, and the remaining 25 percent was paid when the
customer entered in employment (D’Amico et al. 2002).28 In Milwau-
kee, 10 percent was paid when a customer enrolled, 40 percent was
paid when a customer completed the program, and the remaining 50
percent was paid when the customer became employed within 60 days
of completing the training program, earned at least $8 per hour, and
retained employment for 30 days. Essex County (New Jersey) also
used employment retention as a factor for payment by providing the
final 10 percent of the costs to the training provider once the customer
retained employment for 60 days (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague
2003). Different types of training providers may or may not assume
this financial risk. CBOs, even if they have a track record for achieving
high performance outcomes, may find this payment structure finan-
cially unstable and offer their services elsewhere, especially if these
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WIA customers are a small proportion of the provider’s population and
source of revenue. Similarly, other nonprofits and for-profits may sim-
ply decide not to participate if they consider the payment structure to
be too demanding or unfair, especially when non-WIA customers or
other programs are readily available to make full payment of services.
Types of training provider participation
Educational institutions, for-profit/proprietary schools, and non-
profits participate in the WIA training program nationwide, but utiliza-
tion of each type can vary widely by locality. For example, the
important role of community and technical colleges can be seen in
Lane County (Oregon) and Pinellas County (Florida), where nearly 60
percent or more of the customers were referred into community col-
leges, and the Bay Area where more than 90 percent of its customers
were referred into technical colleges in PY 2001.29 On the other hand,
community or technical colleges can also be seldom used, such as in
Northwest (Pennsylvania), Essex County (New Jersey), and Boston
(Massachusetts). Instead, Northwest and Essex counties utilized for-
profits and Boston utilized nonprofits a majority of the time in PY
2001 (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). Although localities
may rely on certain types of providers over others, all three types of
providers play an important role for the national workforce investment
system.
Community colleges and other educational institutions. Com-
munity and technical colleges are used for a number of reasons, includ-
ing the reasonable costs associated with a state-subsidized system, the
ability of customers to utilize Pell Grants, strong support from some
states for localities and the public educational system to work together,
and the availability of a wider range of programs than what is generally
offered by for-profits and nonprofits (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague
2003; D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming). Macro, Almandsmith, and
Hague (2003) found that educational institutions played an important
role as training providers, receiving a larger percentage of ITAs than
either for-profits or nonprofits in the intermediary study. Among all
public and private educational institutions, community and technical
colleges accounted for over 40 percent of the total ITAs issued by the
localities. However, the certification process under WIA has had an
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adverse impact on the participation of community colleges. In April
2002, only 35 of more than 100 community colleges in California were
participating in the WIA system.30 In fact, based on early experiences
of WIA, community colleges were expected to decrease in WIA partic-
ipation due to state performance requirements for the ETPL (D’Amico
et al. 2001). WIA-funded training customers are a small subset of the
colleges’ entire student body, but these small proportions can constitute
a large proportion of the WIA training population.
Many educational institutions generally believe that they are
responsible for “education, not employment,” and that focusing on
employment is inconsistent with the institutions’ goals (Grubb 1996;
D’Amico et al. 2002). However, community college perception of a
conflict between “education” and “employment” is disappearing. The
community college system in the 1990s placed increasing emphasis on
workforce development. While continuing to maintain a role in sup-
porting academic students who seek to transfer to four-year colleges,
community colleges have aimed to gain an increasing share of the
workforce development training market, whether funded by employers
or publicly, and thereby provide current and future employees with
education, training, competencies, and skills that employers need to
maintain high performance in a competitive market environment
(Forde 2002). Community colleges in some localities, such as
Macomb-St. Clair (Michigan) and Metro Portland, are also tailoring
their programs to WIA customers by developing shorter-term courses
(D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming).
Community colleges have responded to shortages of skilled work-
ers by providing training directly to workers who came to community
colleges on their own or through JTPA and WIA programs. Commu-
nity colleges also increasingly have developed alliances with firms to
provide customized training for incumbent workers, seeking to be a
key or principal source of training for employers. Increased emphasis
on workforce development has not been in response to expected
increases in JTPA/WIA funding, but rather in response to actual large
increases in formal employer training occurrences that began in the
1980s and the projected continued increase in the future (Carnevale
and Desrochers 1997). 
Both JTPA and WIA have put a heavy emphasis on placement.
Under WIA, training providers’ success is documented by the Con-
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sumer Report System. Yet, one study found that the community college
system does not have strong placement programs. Community colleges
as large as 25,000 tend to have understaffed placement offices consist-
ing of two or three staff. Placement offices tend to put more emphasis
on temporary placement during school attendance; as a result, job
openings posted by employers are mostly temporary, low-wage jobs
for students. There are few openings listed for full-time jobs in areas of
study. Placement offices are also perceived by employers as not fol-
lowing up sufficiently or making effective use of employer openings,
and when they do follow up, not referring the best candidates for the
job. A community college was more effective when its state set a
placement goal, had effective co-op programs, and when its placement
office made use of job developers to find job openings for students.
Placement can also be made by occupational instructors, but few
instructors were found to engage in placement activities, and place-
ment is not normally considered part of their job (Grubb 1996).
In the past, community colleges have had limited incentives to col-
lect postenrollment labor force outcome data or serve the disadvan-
taged, especially without any clear guidance from the state.
Community colleges serve students with a wide variety of goals, many
of which do not deal with subsequent employment. Also, transfer
placement rates of students into four-year colleges has often been con-
sidered the “primary measure of success” (Alssid et al. 2002). With
weak incentives, postenrollment labor force outcome data can be diffi-
cult and expensive to collect. It has also not been a high priority for
community colleges because, in most cases, federal, state and local
governments have not pushed colleges to collect the data. The coming
of performance accountability indicators under WIA and the Carl D.
Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act has changed this situ-
ation. While the WIA Consumer Reports System requires that there be
records of customer placement, employment, and earnings, the com-
munity college system generally does not collect this information.
Except in states that have previously emphasized placement as an
important outcome for community colleges, little information has been
collected that could be used for submitting data for certification for the
WIA Eligible Training Provider list. Prior to the enactment of WIA,
Florida, Minnesota, and Ohio were among the few states that devel-
oped tracking systems using telephone surveys. Based on these sys-
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tems, the states developed placement goals of around 70–75 percent.
As a precursor to the approach of WIA, some states were testing the
use of unemployment insurance wage records, but this was only in its
early stages when WIA was enacted (Grubb 1996; Baj et al.1991).
The American Association of Community Colleges (AACC) has
responded to the introduction of WIA performance accountability mea-
sures by asking for more flexible measures that would allow commu-
nity colleges to use data they already collect or data that would be
easiest for them to collect. Community colleges would like flexibility
in what they measure, such as choosing whether the program comple-
tion measure was attainment of a degree/certificate, a measured skill,
an individual’s personal goal, or learning a defined skill. They would
also like to choose the method of measurement, such as measuring
earnings using unemployment insurance wage records or a wage sur-
vey (AACC 2002). This interest in easing the burden of collecting out-
come data is understandable given the small incidence of WIA-funded
students at community colleges, and it may provide the best available,
easily collectible outcome information. However, these changes would
also reduce the comparability of data and, therefore, the degree of
accountability in training and education programs.
More recently, there has been close coordination of policy between
the U.S. Departments of Education and Labor to coordinate the reau-
thorization of the Perkins Act and WIA. The goal of this policy is to
ratify that “community colleges are the engines for workforce develop-
ment in this country” by “examining ways to enhance the community
colleges’ growing role in workforce development” by reexamining
federal policies that “inadvertently discourage community college
activity in workforce development” (D’Amico 2002).
For-profit organizations. Unlike community colleges, proprietary
schools tend to be more flexible and have a greater tendency to use
open-entry exit programs. They also tend to have shorter, more inten-
sive courses that were commonly perceived to be more appropriate for
WIA participants. Proprietary schools often tracked performance for
accreditation or for their own internal records. As a result, proprietary
schools generally do not have as many concerns with reporting data or
outcomes. One-stop staff generally had the sense that proprietary
schools provided active counseling and were more experienced and
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equipped to manage progress and reporting requirements (D’Amico et
al. 2002).
However, not all proprietary schools feel at ease with the transition
to WIA. Some proprietary schools that have depended largely on JTPA
customers have not been able to transition to the unpredictable flows of
customers that came with the new ITA system. Some have begun to
market themselves to other non-WIA customers, while others have
closed down. These types of proprietary schools, like the CBOs that
depended heavily on JTPA customers, are not likely to continue suc-
cessfully as providers under the ITA system (D’Amico 2002). Addi-
tionally, providers that do not offer placement services, or have not
been successful in placing customers into employment, are also likely
to be at risk during subsequent eligibility (Macro, Almandsmith, and
Hague 2003).
Nonprofit organizations. Under JTPA, many CBOs held group
contracts for classroom training. CBOs are usually established in the
localities and specialized with serving specific populations, especially
harder-to-serve populations. The use of open competition and vouchers
instead of group contracts could affect their participation in the WIA
system. For example, CBOs in Boston expected to lose about one-third
of their enrollees during the transition to WIA, based on their experi-
ences with vouchers under a previous pilot program (Buck 2002).
Other localities also believed that CBOs would participate less under
WIA due to the focus on vouchers instead of contracts (D’Amico
2002). 
Unlike contracted group training where CBOs could be guaranteed
a certain number of enrollees based on their contractual agreement
with localities, the use of ITAs could no longer provide such a guaran-
tee. CBOs have observed fluctuations in registered students but have
little experience with planning or responding to unpredictable flows.
As a result, many small nonprofits with modest budgets can be vulner-
able to financial risk when they experience erratic customer flow,
which may lead them to discontinue WIA participation (D’Amico et.
al. 2002; Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). On the other hand,
some CBOs have tried to improve their competitive positions within
the WIA training environment by changing the format of their pro-
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grams into shorter, more intense programs that are similar to the pro-
grams of proprietary schools (D’Amico et al. 2001). 
CBOs also have other alternatives if they continue to experience
difficulty connecting with the ITA system, such as by offering their ser-
vices elsewhere, e.g., the welfare system (Buck 2002). CBOs generally
have a history with other federal programs that support training for
special populations of customers who are harder to serve, such as
TANF recipients. Because welfare programs have a larger funding
stream than WIA in many localities, and because CBOs are specialized
in serving specific populations, CBOs may be able to turn to the TANF
system as a source of training customers. 
Brokering and Consulting Services
Local boards, one-stop operators, and service providers constantly
make operational decisions to improve their management and delivery
of services in the workforce development system. Assistance with
these types of decisions are offered by brokering and consulting orga-
nizations that specialize in working with stakeholders to help them
achieve their goals. The Council for Adult and Experiential Learning
(CAEL) and the Structured Employment Economic Development Cor-
poration (Seedco) are examples of nonprofit organizations that provide
assistance on topics such as capacity building, strategic planning, and
program and financial management. CAEL, for example, provides
technical assistance with seeking funding and developing partnerships
with business, government, labor and higher education (CAEL 2003).31
Seedco, which is discussed further in the next section, provides techni-
cal assistance to small organizations and also helps foster partnerships
among stakeholders. Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague (2003) reported
that a number of the local boards in the intermediary study contracted
with for-profit firms most often for consulting services such as infor-
mation systems development, research, monitoring services, and mar-
keting and public relations. These intermediaries can play an important
role in improving the quality of services and management in the one-
stop system.
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UTILIZATION OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE
This section describes the benefits from economies of scale that
can assist organizations maintain their competitiveness in the work-
force investment system. We then identify four organizations, Good-
will Industries, Affiliated Computer Services, Employment Services,
and Seedco, that actively participate in the system.
Larger organizations, regardless of whether they are nonprofits,
for-profits, or public organizations, have the ability to consolidate
functions and offer to their local offices or affiliates important services
that may not be readily available to smaller organizations. These
advantages include important access to capital as well as expertise on
program and financial management (Winston et al. 2002). National
headquarters can devote full-time staff to focus on specific subject
areas, such as grantwriting or legislation, and provide technical assis-
tance on program and financial management to the local offices. Local
offices can also receive access to listservs, newsletters, policy updates,
and conferences (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). Addition-
ally, centralized purchasing of supplies and other items, particularly
software and hardware for management information systems, can con-
tribute to cost-efficiency.
Financial stability and access to capital can affect an organization’s
participation with WIA programs. When an organization has a diverse
set of funding sources, they are less likely to be affected by changes in
WIA funding. For example, Goodwill received $80–$90 million in
ETA Welfare-to-Work grants and has found that the Welfare-to-Work
program is easier to participate in than WIA itself (Crosby 2002).
Organizations that are not reliant on WIA can more easily decide to opt
in or out of the system. On the other hand, organizations who do not
have access to other funding sources can be more vulnerable to WIA
changes. Preliminary observations showed that CBOs and for-profit
training providers alike were susceptible to folding if they were heavily
dependent on JTPA funding but could no longer obtain guarantees of
funding from ITAs (D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming; Macro,
Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). Also, poor financial management and
lack of access to a sufficient line of credit to operate under a cost-reim-
bursement contract were often issues that resulted in turnover for one-
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stop operators (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). Although
smaller organizations may be more susceptible to these problems,
Seedco President William Grinker suggests that developing networks
of small organizations can help them achieve similar benefits of the
larger organizations (Grinker 1999).
Goodwill Industries International, Inc. Goodwill Industries is
one of the largest nonprofit providers of workforce development ser-
vices in the United States, with a mission to serve primarily disadvan-
taged workers. In 2002, 179 local affiliates served over 500,000
workers, providing services in more than 94 percent of the counties in
the country. Goodwill has grown rapidly during a period of shrinking
JTPA programs. Local affiliates of Goodwill workforce services are
autonomous 501(3c) organizations that operate under local-national
agreements. Local affiliates benefit from the Goodwill name and logo,
the exclusive use of the local area to operate its retail stores, and a
range of services provided by the national office.
In 2000, Goodwill’s revenues of $1.85 billion included $364 mil-
lion in workforce development revenues, as grants from government
agencies. Goodwill operated 55 temporary services agencies and was
the one-stop operator in 19 localities (Goodwill Industries International
2001). More than 60 affiliates provide services to more than 125 one-
stop centers. Goodwill provides a range of employment and training
services to customers, including placement services, welfare-to-work
services, case management, and job readiness (Crosby 2002).
The largest customer for Goodwill’s workforce development ser-
vices is TANF, followed by Vocational Rehabilitation and WIA. The
revenue from retail stores provides a majority of the funding (about 80
percent) to deliver employment and training services to customers.
WIA funds are a small proportion of Goodwill’s public funding
sources and are used to supplement revenues generated from the Good-
will stores that are used to subsidize their workforce development
activities. WIA is important to Goodwill because Goodwill staff is bet-
ter linked to customers when they work on-site or closely with the one-
stop centers to deliver services (Crosby 2002).
Local affiliates receive a wide array of services from the national
headquarters that help them with bidding for services and improving
operations. The national headquarters provides grant writing assistance
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to local affiliates by making available a certified federal grants admin-
istrator and full-time grant writers, sponsoring workshops on grant
writing, providing a collection of successful proposals, and offering
online tools. The national headquarters or field staff, who may contract
with consultants, provide technical assistance on an on-going basis,
which can be particularly helpful if new affiliates struggle with service
delivery. The benefits of economies of scale are apparent when the
national headquarters researches and brokers purchasing deals for
items used nationwide, such as computer hardware and software.
Goodwill also develops its own software and plans to create a stan-
dardized client tracking system with financial data to provide the
national headquarters and affiliates with real time data on customers
(Crosby 2002).
Affiliated Computer Services (ACS). Formerly Lockheed Martin
IMS, ACS is one of the leading for-profit organizations that provide
workforce development services. ACS is an information technology
and business process outsourcing Fortune 1000 company that acquired
the Lockheed-Martin IMS unit in June 2001. Lockheed Martin IMS
was the workforce development services portion of Lockheed Martin
that specialized in welfare and workforce services, child support
enforcement, child care management, and electronic toll collection.
The unit has about 4,100 employees located in 275 locations, and is
now called the “Workforce and Community Solutions” unit of ACS,
with headquarters based in Austin, Texas.32 In 2003, ACS provided ser-
vices to about 50 local boards and served as the one-stop operator of
103 one-stop centers. In Texas and Florida, ACS was the one-stop
operator and organization responsible for core and intensive services,
while in California ACS provided services for local areas but did not
serve as the one-stop operator (Zeitler 2003). 
The ACS headquarters provides assistance to the local office staff
in various ways. These include using “train the trainer” sessions and
employing subject matter experts to oversee quality and project status.
Grant writing is centralized at the ACS headquarters, which relieves
local offices from having to devote much of their resources performing
the task. Proprietary software and a client tracking system have been
developed and are available for local offices, but are not required if the
local board prefers to use a different system. Hiring is generally con-
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ducted at the local office, but headquarters can provide assistance to
the local levels if necessary. Despite the recent acquisition to ACS, the
same processes and much of the same staff, in place when the organi-
zation was under Lockheed Martin, remain the same under ACS
(Zeitler 2003).
ACS has financial and staff resources to provide many of the ser-
vices that a national nonprofit organization provides, such as technical
assistance and consolidated functions in a national headquarters.
Unlike Goodwill, which has local affiliates that are autonomous and
responsible for their own financial and accounting mechanisms in
place, ACS retains overall responsibility for local offices. Since ACS
provides numerous services outside of its workforce development unit,
it can likely withstand fluctuations, including decreases, in WIA funds
because of other funding opportunities. ACS receives funds for work-
force development services primarily through WIA, but has seen a
decrease in WIA funding over the past few years. TANF is the next
largest source of funding for these services. ACS is involved primarily
with direct service delivery and limits its involvement to providing
management and consulting services to local boards. Few for-profit
firms in the ETA intermediary study provide youth services, but ACS
plans to expand in this area (Zeitler 2003).33
In 2000, Lockheed Martin IMS had $580 million in revenue, and
ACS estimated that it would increase to $700 million in 2001 (Wake-
man and Welsh 2001). The President and CEO of ACS stated, “Our
objective is to be premier provider of diversified business process out-
sourcing services, delivering a full range of services to multiple verti-
cal markets.” According to an ACS press release, the company
expected a greater percentage of government expenditures to be out-
sourced due to a “rise in fiscal pressures, changing regulations, and
increased accountability . . . to streamline program operations” (Intelli-
gent Transportation System Access 2001).
The Employment Service (ES). The ES is a governmental agency
with over 60 years of experience providing labor exchange and other
services in locations nationwide. Each local ES office is part of a larger
state workforce security agency that operates under a national legisla-
tive mandate and has experienced a relatively fixed though stagnant
funding level. The national office provides information and guidance
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about new rules and procedures. Automated labor market information
and labor exchange programs provide a national system of labor
exchange and labor market information.34 In addition to the national
system, each state ES agency also maintains an automated state labor
market information system and has an established network of employ-
ers across the state that local offices can access. State ES agencies are
able to put in place exclusive hiring agreements with private employers
and provide training and capacity building for local offices, with ser-
vices standardized across localities. Staffing and financial functions are
also standardized, and local offices benefit from central purchasing.
Another important feature is the state ES agencies’ authority to open
new local offices in areas that are determined to be in need of ES ser-
vices.35 Additionally, WIA regulations mandating ES as a required
partner in the one-stop center can provide ES with a physical advan-
tage of co-location within the centers. ES has a long-standing history of
providing labor exchange services, and most localities from studies on
early WIA experiences selected ES as a primary provider of core ser-
vices (D’Amico 2001; Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). 
Structured Employment Economic Development Corporation
(Seedco). Seedco is a national nonprofit intermediary that assists orga-
nizations improve in areas such as workforce operations, capacity-
building, and performance and financial management. It assists small
organizations consolidate functions, such as accounting and reporting,
to improve their performance so that organizations can focus on direct
service provision. The purpose is to allow small intermediaries to bet-
ter compete with larger intermediaries through sharing of resources.
Seedco also helps nonprofits establish a diverse set of funding sources
to become economically sustainable. To further assist with financial
independence and stability, Seedco brokers funds for community
groups with cash flow needs. Seedco also develops tools, such as the
Performance Measurement and Management (PM&M) system, to
assist nonprofits measure and manage performance (Seedco 2002).
Seedco has provided technical assistance to numerous organiza-
tions, and grants from foundations and the government have helped
support these efforts. For example, a USDOL grant was awarded to
Seedco to provide assistance to CBOs to increase their participation in
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the workforce investment system.36 Seedco has customers located in
twenty states, and Washington, DC (Seedco 2002). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Intermediaries have greater participation in the system under WIA
as a result of new one-stop centers that were created nationwide and
local boards being prohibited from delivering direct services. Based on
early accounts of WIA implementation, the following summarizes
what has been observed of intermediary characteristics and service
provision.
Intermediary Provision of Services
• Nonprofit organizations and consortiums are generally
selected to serve as one-stop operators. Few local boards decide
to deliver one-stop operator services themselves, choosing
instead to use a variety of other providers. 
• ES plays a large role in providing core services, especially as a
primary provider of the services. When ES is not the primary
provider of core services, this responsibility is usually assigned to
the one-stop operators, which tend to be nonprofits.
• Nonprofit organizations are major providers of intensive and
youth services.  Intensive services are often the responsibility of
the organization selected as the one-stop operator. CBOs with
established histories are generally used to deliver services for
specific populations, such as youth, dislocated workers, low-
wage workers, and ex-offenders. 
• Certain types of training providers, especially community col-
leges and smaller CBOs, are reluctant to participate in an
ITA/ETPL system, but for different reasons. Many community
colleges are not willing to provide customer data because of the
resources needed to collect and maintain information for initial
and subsequent eligibility, especially when the WIA customer is a
small fraction of the colleges’ student population. Community
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colleges would prefer to submit data that they have already col-
lected, or data that is easier to collect than the current ETPL
requirements. Smaller CBOs, on the other hand, tend to rely more
on WIA customers and funding. Because of this, they are more
vulnerable to the uncertainties of a voucher system that replaces
group-contracted training. These CBOs may find it financially
beneficial to diversify and provide training elsewhere, outside of
the WIA system.
Intermediary Advantages in the One-Stop Environment
• Larger organizations, regardless of whether they are for-
profits or nonprofits, can have an advantage over smaller
organizations when competing for WIA services. Larger orga-
nizations have resources to support full-time staff to specialize in
services where smaller organizations may find it difficult to do
so, e.g., establish networks with federal government and other
stakeholders, provide technical assistance and training, and assist
with the bidding process. Larger providers may also better with-
stand the implementation of a voucher system that utilizes open
competition, and are less reliant on WIA funding because they
can seek other sources of funding. 
• Small community-based organizations dominate youth ser-
vices. More competition (and more choice for local boards)
appears to exist among intermediaries for youth services. For-
profits are generally not involved in youth services; there may be
too much competition from other organizations, or not enough
profit. 
Notes
The content of this chapter reflects the opinions of the authors and does not represent
the policy or positions of the U.S. Department of Labor. We thank John Colborn and
Norton Grubb for helpful comments.
1.  The term intermediaries has been recently defined and applied in the workforce
investment system in different ways. In this chapter, we apply a broad definition
used by Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague (2003) in an ETA study that referred
intermediaries to public and private organizations who receive funding from local
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boards to serve WIA customers or perform WIA-related functions.  A separate
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services study conducted by Pavetti et al.
(2000) defined intermediaries as organizations that hold formal relationships with
the welfare office (or other administrative entity) responsible for moving welfare
recipients into the labor market, including training providers that provide place-
ment services.  In Workforce Intermediaries for the Twenty-First Century, Leete et
al. (2004) broadly define labor  market intermediaries as organizations that work
at various levels of the labor market (such as job placement, training, and support
services) to help link individuals to jobs. These would include temporary place-
ment agencies and head hunters, unions, CBOs, nonprofits, governmental organi-
zations, community and technical colleges, vocational schools, and associations.
In the same book, Osterman (2004) also considers labor market intermediaries to
include Internet job-matching agencies (such as www.monster.com and
www.guru.com).
However, Giloth (2004) distinguishes another set of intermediaries, which he
labels as workforce intermediaries, as a much narrower subset of organizations
under labor market intermediaries. According to Giloth, workforce intermediar-
ies, among other objectives, specifically serve both employers and low-income/
less-skilled individuals, create and manage different funding streams, and provide
job placement with other services. However, it is the broader definition, and not
this narrow one, that we and (other sources) are more likely to associate with the
term intermediaries.
2. The Employment Service (ES) is also referred to as Job Service in some states.
The responsibilities of ES have evolved over the years as a result of changing leg-
islation and priorities. See National Commission for Employment Policy (1991).
3. See Wandner and Javar (2001) for further discussion of privatization efforts under
UI and ES. See Balducchi and Pasternak (2000) for a discussion of the issue of
privatization of ES.
 4. Employers, state apprenticeship agencies, trade associations, unions, and non-
profit community agencies provided most of the on-the-job training (Levitan and
Mangum 1969). In an MDTA longitudinal evaluation sample of 10 metropolitan
areas, of the 54 training facilities that held contracts funded by the federal govern-
ment (with some facilities receiving more than one contract), approximately two-
thirds were public intermediaries and one-third were private intermediaries. Of
the public intermediaries, most were either skill centers or community colleges.
5. Three large CBOs in particular, the National Urban League, Opportunities Indus-
trialization Centers, and SER, significantly increased their work (Snedeker and
Snedeker 1978).
6. In FY 1975, 700 ES positions were cut as a result of decreased contracts (Snede-
ker and Snedeker 1978).
7. This figure does not include Public Service Employment funding.
8. ES also defined cost categories differently than JTPA programs and did not have a
15 percent limit on administrative costs, which may be another factor for why ES
was selected.
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9. Welfare-to-Work grants were awarded to local governments, local boards, and
other entities (such as community development corporations and CBOs, commu-
nity action agencies, and other private organizations) that applied with a local
board or local government. 
10. Six states (Florida, Texas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont) became
early implementers of WIA. D’Amico et al. (2001) visited these states and locali-
ties as part of their study on early WIA implementation experiences.
11. In developing ETA’s Five-Year Strategic Plan for pilots, demonstrations, research,
and evaluation for July 2000–June 2005, an Expert Panel meeting was convened
to discuss high priority research topics for ETA to focus on in the next five years.
The Expert Panel agreed that intermediaries play a large role in the workforce
development system, but that little information was known about these entities,
and to what extent they were working with local boards in serving the locality’s
customers.
12. According to figures on January 27, 2003, there were 1,933 comprehensive one-
stop centers nationwide, 1,604 affiliate centers, and 591 local workforce invest-
ment areas (www.servicelocator.org).
13. Results are based on data collected from the Workforce System Information and
Evaluation (WSIE) survey (D’Amico et al. 2001). 
14. Minimizing staff training and transitional costs, or desiring continuity of staff, are
some reasons why former staff may be rehired by the new operator, e.g., the
Lower Rio Grande local board (Texas) switched from a for-profit to a nonprofit to
serve as the one-stop operator. The for-profit and nonprofit proposals were rated
as a statistical tie, but the for-profit had an $800,000 cost difference for an 8
month period. Interestingly, the nonprofit that hoped to receive the new contract
was previously the administrative arm of a private industry council, but had been
a separate organization for five years (Lower Rio Grande Workforce Develop-
ment Board 2002).
15. Nearly half (48 percent) of the comprehensive one-stop centers were operated by
nonprofits (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
16. Although collaboratives and consortiums both are associations that band more
than one organization together, Macro et al. (2003) distinguishes “collaboratives”
from “consortiums” because collaboratives do not consist of at least three
required WIA partners.
17. Milwaukee grandfathered the TANF service providers as one-stop operators. The
decision to transform existing employment and training service locations into new
one-stop centers, and select existing organizations as the one-stop operators or
lead operators, has been evident in other localities as well. Consortiums in locali-
ties that transformed their existing ES buildings into new one-stop centers often
had ES staff act as the lead in the consortium (D’Amico et al. 2001).
18. In this case, Lockheed Martin IMS was the former one-stop operator that decided
not to re-compete for the contract (Jacobson 2002).
19. In 7 of the 9 localities, ES was the primary provider of core services (D’Amico et
al. 2001). 
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20. Gulf Coast (Texas) was the only locality that used a for-profit organization (which
was also the one-stop operator) to deliver core services (Macro, Almandsmith,
and Hague 2003).
21. Only about one-sixth of the local boards nationwide received a waiver to provide
core and intensive services, as of October 2000 (D’Amico et al. 2001). In the
intermediary study, none of the local boards delivered intensive services (Macro,
Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
22. Intensive services have also been delivered out of affiliate centers, in addition to
the comprehensive one-stops. Table 5.1 underestimates the total number of inten-
sive service providers that are used in the one-stop system because it represents
those used only in comprehensive one-stops. 
23. The two national for-profit companies included Sylvan Learning Centers and
ACS (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
24. Boston went from 24 to 34 providers, primarily with the entry of new proprietary
schools, but almost one-third of the providers that held contracts under JTPA did
not apply. In Charlotte, the number of providers remained the same at 16, but the
mix of providers was not the same. Houston experienced a decrease from 120 to
95 providers, and officials believed that this was a result of a voluntary loss of
CBO participation due to required performance benchmarks. Philadelphia
increased from 56 to 64 providers, with nearly half of all providers being new to
the workforce development system (Buck 2002).
25. Seventeen of the twenty-seven states requested to extend the initial period of pro-
vider eligibility to June 30, 2004. In fact, several states had submitted second
requests to extend their previously approved dates of initial eligibility to a new
end date of June 30, 2004.
26. In the ITA/ETP Demonstration report, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Mary-
land, Nebraska, Oregon, and Pennsylvania instituted these types of state certifica-
tion or licensing from the state higher education commission, or equivalent
(D’Amico et al. 2002).
27. Other providers were the TANF programs ($70 million), Welfare-to-Work grants
($25 million), secondary vocational education ($9.5 million), and a Community
Services Grant ($3.6 million) (Buck 2002).
28. As of October 2002, the Southwest Connecticut local board changed the bench-
mark payment structure to 50 percent payment when the customer attends the first
class, instead of 50 percent payment after the customer attends half of the training
program.
29. Other states with an extensive system of technical colleges include Georgia, North
Carolina, Texas, and Indiana (D’Amico et al. 2002).
30. Numbers based on April 2002 meeting on WIA reauthorization held in Los Ange-
les.
31. CAEL also works with localities to improve program services, such as working
with Chicago to serve as the Training Assessment and Review Agency in the local
ITA system.
32. The ACS company has about 30,000 employees (Zeitler 2003).
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33. Although ACS has had youth service contracts since 1996, the effort in expanding
these services is fairly new.
34. America’s Job Bank and America’s Career Kit are part of ES services for nation-
wide networks. State ES also maintain electronic labor exchange services for the
state.
35. The ES office must be affiliated with the one-stop system, serving as either a sat-
ellite center, specialty center, or within a comprehensive one-stop center.
36. For more information on this and other grants awarded to Seedco, see “Field-
notes,” available at www.seedco.org/about/field/index.html.
References
Alssid, Julian L., David Gruber, Davis Jenkins, Christopher Mazzeo, Brandon
Roberts, and Regina Sanback-Stroud. 2002. Building a Career Pathways
System: Promising Practicies in Community College-Centered Workforce
Development. Brooklyn, NY: Workforce Strategy Center.
American Association of Community Colleges (AACC). 2002. “Workforce
Accountability Measures Proposed.” http://www.aacc.nche.edu/Content/
ContentGroups/Headline_News/May_2002/Wrkfrcaccb.pdf. 
Baj, John, C. Trott, and David Stevens. 1991. A Feasibility Study of the Use of
Unemployment Insurance Wage-Record Data as an Evaluation Tool for
JTPA. Research Report 90-02. Washington, DC: National Commission for
Employment Policy. 
Balducchi, David E., and Alison J. Pasternak. 2000. “One-Stop Statecraft:
Restructuring Workforce Development Programs in the United States.”
Labour Market Policies and the Public Employment Service. Prague Con-
ference, July 2000. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. 
Buck, Maria L. 2002. Charting New Territory: Early Implementation of the
Workforce Investment Act. New York, NY: Public/Private Ventures. http://
www.ppv.org/pdffiles/charting.pdf.
Carnevale, Anthony, and Donna M. Desrochers. 1997. “The Role of Commu-
nity Colleges in the New Economy.” Community College Journal 66(5):
27–33.
Council for Adult and Experiential Learning (CAEL). 2003 Web site.
www.cael.org. Accessed September 20, 2003.
Crosby, Kathy. 2002. Director of Workforce Development. Goodwill Indus-
tries, Inc. Personal communication with one author, August 2.
D’Amico, Carole. 2002. “Q & A with Carole D’Amico.” Community College
Journal 72(6): 22–23. 
The Use of Service Providers in Employment and Training Programs 173
D’Amico, Ronald, and Jeffrey Salzman. Forthcoming. An Evaluation of the
Individual Training Account/Eligible Training Provider Demonstration:
Draft Final Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employ-
ment and Training Administration.
D’Amico, Ronald, Deborah Koga, Suzanne Kreutzer, Andrew Wiegand, and
Alberta Baker. 2001. A Report on Early State and Local Progress Towards
WIA Implementation: Final Interim Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.
D’Amico, Ronald, Alexandria Martinez, Jeffrey Salzman, and Robin Wagner.
2002. An Evaluation of the Individual Training Account/Eligible Training
Provider Demonstration: Interim Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. 
Eberts, Randall W. 2002. Design, Implementation, and Evaluation of the Work
First Profiling Pilot Project. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor.
Forde, Margaret L. 2002. “Community Colleges—The Center of the Work-
force Development Universe.” Community College Journal 72(6): 32–35. 
Franklin, Grace A., and Randall B. Ripley. 1984. CETA: Politics and Policy
1973-1982. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press.
Giloth, Robert P. 2004. “Introduction: A Case for Workforce Intermediaries.”
In Workforce Intermediaries for the Twenty-First Century, Robert Giloth,
ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Goodwill Industries International. 2001. “Statement of Corporate Capabili-
ties.” August 15. Bethesda, MD.
Grinker, William. 1999. Keynote speech at the conference, “Beyond JTPA and
Welfare-to-Work: Building a Workforce Development Infrastructure.”
Held in Tarrytown, NY, November 11.
Grubb, W. Norton. 1996. Working in the Middle: Strengthening Education and
Training for the Mid-Skilled Labor Force. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass
Publishers. 
Intelligent Transportation System Access. 2001. “ACS Acquires Lockheed
Martin IMS.” http://www.itsa.org/itsnews.nsf.
Jacobson, Louis. 2002. Member, Montgomery County Workforce Investment
Board. Personal communication with one author, March 29.
Leete, Laura, Chris Benner, Manuel Pastor Jr., and Sarah Zimmerman. 2004.
“Labor Market Intermediaries in the Old and New Economies: A Survey of
Worker Experiences in Milwaukee and Silicon Valley.” In Workforce Inter-
mediaries for the Twenty-First Century, Robert Giloth, ed. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Leonard, Paul. 1999. Welfare to Work Block Grants: Are They Working? Dis-
cussion paper prepared for The Brookings Institution, Center on Urban and
174 Javar and Wandner
Metropolitan Policy. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. http://
www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/urban/leonard.pdf.
Levitan, Sar A., and Garth L. Mangum. 1969. Federal Training and Work
Programs in the Sixties. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute of Labor and Industrial
Relations, University of Michigan, Wayne State University.
Lower Rio Grande Workforce Development Board. Minutes from meeting,
October 25. http://www.wfsolutions.com/boardmeeting_
112900_2.html. (Accessed on April 25, 2002.)
Macro, Bronwen, Sherry Almandsmith, and Megan Hague. 2003. Creating
Partnerships for Workforce Investment: How Services Are Provided under
WIA. Oakland, CA: Berkeley Policy Associates. 
National Commission for Employment Policy. 1991. Improving the Effective-
ness of the Employment Service: Defining the Issues. Washington, DC:
National Commission for Employment Policy.
———. 1994. A Guide to Major Federal Job Training Programs. Washing-
ton, DC: National Commission for Employment Policy.
Operations Research, Inc. 1972. Longitudinal Evaluation Study of Four Man-
power Training Programs: Cost and Enrollee Data. Appendix A: MDTA
Cost and Enrollee Data. Washington, DC: Office of Economic Opportu-
nity, Division of Evaluation.
O’Shea, Daniel, and Christopher T. King. 2001. The Workforce Investment Act
of 1998: Restructuring Workforce Development Initiatives in States and
Localities. Albany, NY: Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government.
Osterman, Paul. 2004. “Labor Market Intermediaries in the Modern Labor
Market.” In Workforce Intermediaries for the Twenty-First Century, Robert
Giloth, ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Pavetti, Donna, Michelle Derr, Jacquelyn Anderson, Carole Trippe, and Sid-
nee Paschal. 2000. The Role of Intermediaries in Linking TANF Recipients
with Jobs. Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research.
Reville, Robert T., and Jacob Alex Kerman. 1996. “Job Training: Impact on
California of Further Consolidation and Devolution.” In The New Fiscal
Federalism and the Social Safety Net: A View from California, James
Hosek and Robert Levine, eds. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. http://
www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF123/reville.
Seedco. 2002. New Patterns, New Strategies: Corporate Report January
2001–December 2002. New York, NY: Seedco. http://www.seedco.org/
about/whatsnew/annrept1/index.html.
Snedeker, Bonnie B., and David W. Snedeker. 1978. CETA: Decentralization
on Trial. Salt Lake City, UT: Olympus Publishing Company. 
The Use of Service Providers in Employment and Training Programs 175
U.S. Department of Labor. 2000. Annual Report. U.S. Employment Service
Program Report Data: Program Year 1998. Washington, DC: United
States Department of Labor.
Wakeman, Nick, and William Welsh. 2001. “ACS to Buy Lockheed Martin
IMS in $825 Million Deal.” Washington Technology, July 19, 2001.
Wandner, Stephen A. 1997. “Early Reemployment of Dislocated Workers in
the United States.” International Social Security Review 50(4): 95–112.
Wandner, Stephen A., and Janet O. Javar. 2001. “Trends in Private Sector
Involvement in the Delivery of Workforce Development Services in the
United States.” In Social Security at the Dawn of the 21st Century. Donate
Dobernack, Dalmer D. Hoskins, and Christiane Kuptsch, eds. New York:
Transaction Publishers. 
Westat, Inc. 1985. Implementation of the Job Training Partnership Act: Final
Report. Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Labor.
Winston, Pamela, Andrew Burwick, Sheena McConnell, and Richard Roper.
2002. Privatization of Welfare Services: A Review of the Literature. Wash-
ington, DC: Department of Health and Human Services. 
Zeitler, Amy. 2003. Director of Business Developments. ACS State and Local










W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Job training policy in the United States / Christopher J. O’Leary, Robert A. Straits, 
Stephen A. Wandner editors.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-88099-306-5 (pbk.: alk. paper)—ISBN 0-88099-307-3 (hardcover : alk. 
paper)
1. Occupational training—Government policy—United States. 2. Occupational 
training—United States—Evaluation. I. O’Leary, Christopher J. II. Straits, Robert A. 





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007–4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are the
sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underhill.
Index prepared by Nancy Humphreys.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
